December 17, 2001

Zinda Says

FEDERATION OR AUTONOMY?

This is the most burning question tackled - surreptitiously of course - among the Kurdish and Turkoman groups of northern Iraq. In public and in meetings with the U.S. and U.N. officials it makes sense to claim an equivocal desire for a federation of Iraqi ethnicities. On the other hand, there are strong indications pointing away from the creation of a pluralistic Iraq. Let's examine these in more detail.

Last Thursday the Turkish state-owned petroleum company, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPC), announced that it plans to join the Kurds of northern Iraq in an ambitious oil exploration project in northern Bet-Nahrain. It plans to build 20 drilling sites under a contract with the North Iraqi state oil company. The drilling is to be carried out in the region controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party or Masoud Barazani's backyard, where a majority of Assyrians in North Iraq live.

Guess who else came for dinner last week in Ankara? Bin-Laden's worst enemy -- Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. Mr. Secretary reassured Turkey that Washington had no immediate plans to extend the war on terrorism to Iraq. At the same time an American delegation was consulting with both Kurdish groups, KDP and PUK, in northern Bet-Nahrain. The delegation, led by senior State Department official Ryan Crocker, met Massoud Barazani and Jalal Talabani and reaffirmed the commitment of President Bush's administration to the protection of the Kurdish region and its 13% share of the UN oil-for-food program. What else has happened this month?:

· The U.S. temporarily transferred the headquarters of its military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia from Georgia to Kuwait.

· President Bush demanded that Iraq open its doors to the inspectors, who have been absent for three years, or face the consequences.

· Eight U.S. legislators called for humanitarian assistance and military training for Iraqi opposition parties.

· Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz proposed using the Shi'ite south, rather than northern Bet-Nahrain, as the means to overthrow Saddam.

· Committee on International Relations was working on a resolution regarding the monitoring of weapons development in Iraq, as required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.

· Assyrian Democratic Movement leadership visited both KDP and PUK leaders to reaffirm its close ties with the rival Kurdish factions.

· The U.S. visitors discussed the implementation of a peace treaty between the PUK and KDP signed in Washington in 1998 - the so-called Washington Accord.

All roads lead to one thing: overthrow of Saddam. So is Washington planning to use northern Bet-Nahrain as a base for attacking Saddam. Of course it is. Then can it guarantee its full support of the local insurgencies when the right time for war is ensued next year? Of course it won't.

Soon after the end of the Gulf War the Iraqi people rose against Saddam and were able to take 14 of the 18 Iraqi provinces. The U.S., influenced by Turkey and perhaps Jordan and Saudi Arabia, decided to stay behind and allowed Saddam to use his helicopters to suppress the revolts. Thousands of anti-Saddam forces perished in these battles. Washington, as with Great Britain of 1918-23, could not be trusted. Assyrians are far too familiar with such bitter after-taste.

Yet, the Kurds and the rest of Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress will certainly fool around with the U.S. cards and let Turkey steal a look as long as North Iraqi oil company can operate independent of Baghdad. After all, "Federation" according to Kurdish diplomats has economic qualities also. Baghdad is not sitting idly here either. Saddam has been asking for dialogue with the Kurds in the north since November. He is assured that northern region will be used as a "launch-pad" for attacks against him. It's not a secret that Barazani has been letting the dictator in Baghdad to peek at his cards a couple of times since August. So who's playing the Assyrian cards here?

A "federation" to Iraqi Kurds is defined as "the full representation of the Kurdish People." Can the U.S. and its allies guarantee full representation of the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq? Will the Assyrian people be also blessed with the ideals of "full representation" once Saddam and his family succeed in escaping the wrath of the Iraqi people? To Assyrians in Iraq a "federation" means "unclear representation" and autonomy is defined as a few extra seats in someone else's parliament. The Assyrians living outside of Bet-Nahrain, however, use a different geo-political dictionary to define these historical terminologies and are quite prepared to offer direct translations in Sorani as early as next January. It is this latter group that will play the Assyrian cards in January.

Chalabi, Barazani, and Talabani know quite well that Assyrians hold a card that no other player will ever be able to possess in Misters Bush and Blair's cardrooms. Assyrians are Christian and live under constant threat of retribution from any Islamic entity in the region - be it Kurdish, Arab, or Turkish. Thanks to Osama Bin-Laden such terms as "Jihad", "Fatwah", and "Infidels" are household words in most American homes. A pluralistic Iraqi society would mean full inclusion of non-Moslem constituency in Iraq's political and economic affairs. Shiites and Kurdish factions must be willing to embrace such extraordinary conditions as appointment of Assyrian cabinet members and ministers in the new government in Baghdad.

So what must be done now? First, all Assyrian political groups must accept the fact that status quo in Iraq is no longer acceptable and Clinton era policy of containment has failed miserably. Saddam must go sooner than later- even if it means making war on Baghdad, resulting in the death of many Assyrian people. Second, whereas Saddam is allergic to the sight of U.N. inspection personnel around his palaces, his objection to their scrutiny of his chemical and nuclear weapons build-up should be proposed as an ideal pretext to attacking Iraq. Third, in the coming weeks all Assyrian political parties must work closely among themselves and other members of the INC to prepare for the post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This groundwork must include either a clear definition of "full representation" or "autonomy" for the Assyrian and all Syriac-speaking Christian citizens of Iraq.

A burning question requires an even more smoldering response. Let there be no mistake! Representing over 1.5 million Christian indigenous inhabitants of Iraq, Assyrians are prepared to endure the heat and take part in the power-sharing arrangements in Washington and Ankara.

Zinda Magazine

Literatus

NEGOTIATING ASSYRIAN IDENTITY IN IRAQ, 1919-1933

Final Part

Preserving ‘Ancient Privilege’: The Assyrian Patriarch

The permanent settlement of the refugee Assyrian community and its political rights under the government of Iraq became a major concern to the League of Nations. Increased attention by the League emboldened the Assyrian patriarch to redefine Assyrian identity in more autonomous political and territorial terms—a transformation that was calculated to preserve the traditional power of the patriarchy.

Service in the Iraq Levies provided a means of income for Assyrian men and their families, yet it failed to resolve the question of the refugee community’s settlement. Various schemes were proposed by the British and attempted; none worked. In January of 1919, British officials sought to reward the Assyrians for their service against rebellious Kurds by creating an Assyrian enclave in the Amadia district near Mosul. To make room for the Assyrians, the British planned to eject the Kurds from their villages in Amadia. Yet the outbreak of the 1920 revolt prevented the implementation of this ill-conceived scheme. In 1921, the refugee camp at Baquba was closed and funds were distributed for the Assyrians to settle in the Dohuk and Aqra area. Many Assyrians drifted across the border to their old homeland to Hakkari, only to be turned away by Turkish authorities in September of 1924.

Subsequent Turkish opposition to an Assyrian presence within or near its frontier with Iraq created new pressures for both the British and the League of Nations. In October of 1924, the Turkish government protested to the League that the "artificial grouping of Assyrians" on its frontier would jeopardize good relations between Turkey and Iraq and threaten the safety of the Assyrians. With the passage of the Iraq Nationality Law of 1924, the Assyrians in northern Iraq were no longer regarded as temporary refugees, but Iraqi citizens. In response to this legislation and Turkish opposition, the League of Nations pressed for guarantees from the Iraqi government and the British mandatory administration for the political and religious rights of the Assyrian community. The League’s report for 1924 states:

We feel it our duty, however, to point out that the Assyrians should be guaranteed the re-establishment of the ancient privileges which they possessed in practice, if not officially, before the war. Which ever may be the sovereign State, it ought to grant these Assyrians a certain local autonomy, recognizing their right to appoint their own officials and contenting itself with a tribute from them, paid through the agency of their Patriarch. (Author’s italics)

By endorsing what it perceived to be the patriarch’s "ancient privileges," the League emboldened the Assyrian elite to resist the centralizing power of the nascent Iraqi state. Perhaps unknowingly, the League had adopted a narrative that did not necessarily correspond to the realities of Assyrian life and did not reflect the self-definition of most Assyrians, but rather one that specifically served the interests of the patriarch. The temporal authority which the Mar Shimun and the League claimed were primordial and "ancient," were in fact the result of recent changes in the community’s political status and, most importantly, the support of yet another foreign patron.

British patronage revived and inflated the temporal authority of the Mar Shimun and the Assyrian aristocracy--known as Maliks--which had waned during the wartime dislocation of the community. When the British sought to recruit the Assyrians for service in the Levies after the war, they purposefully cultivated the political authority of the Mar Shimun and the Malik elite. Acting as convenient intermediaries for the British, the patriarchal family organized recruiting campaigns among the destitute Assyrian refugees. Most Maliks and their sons received commissions as officers. Because the power of the patriarch depended to a large extent upon the geographic concentration of the community, the Levies became an ideal way to strengthen and preserve the channels of his political power.

The impending termination of the mandate, signified by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, created a dilemma for the religious elite by threatening to erode these new institutions of power. While Iraqi nationalists opposed the treaty, citing its preservation of British access to Iraq, the Assyrian elite perceived the treaty as paving the way for Sunni Arab domination. For the Assyrian patriarch, the treaty signaled the loss of an important patron, the elimination of the Levies, and the possible dispersal of his community under Kurdish landlords. Adapting to the new political environment, the Mar Shimun sought to preserve the geographic cohesion of his community within the boundaries of Iraq.

Efforts by the Mar Shimun to emphasize the homogeneity and autonomy of the Assyrian community culminated in the submission of the Assyrian National Petition to the League of Nations on June 18, 1932. This document--signed by Levy officers, influential Maliks, and the Mar Shimun--demanded Assyrian self-government in an autonomous enclave within Iraq and threatened a widespread resignation of Levy personnel. By rejecting both the immediate authority of their British officers and the centralizing power of the Iraqi state, the Levies pledged their obedience to the temporal authority of the Mar Shimun. Aptly termed a "mutiny" in British correspondence, this crisis was averted through a combination of British diplomatic persuasion and show of force. The Levies renounced their threatened resignation, pledged to refrain from future political activity, and promised to wait until December for a decision from the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission.

The National Petition was a significant attempt to redefine Assyrian identity in the context of the Iraqi state, yet it did not represent a broad consensus among the community about its place in the new political order. Instead of reflecting an inherent Assyrian incompatibility with the Iraqi state, the National Petition was the product of elite self-interest and a rising trend of factionalism. A growing opposition movement to the Mar Shimun had begun as early as 1930, with significant numbers of lower-ranking Assyrians willing to assimilate into Iraqi society according to the wishes of the Iraqi government. At its core, the National Petition was an attempt by elite supporters of the Mar Shimun to forestall the dispersal of the community by combining the language of "ancient privilege" with the fashionable terms of self-determination. After the independence of Iraq in October 1932, this reconstituted Assyrian identity proved to be patently intolerable to Iraqi nationalists and the fragile Iraqi government.

The Iraqi Nationalists’ Response

Demands for an autonomous enclave in the country populated by armed Assyrians presented an almost existential challenge to the Iraqi government. Yet its immediate response to the Assyrian National Petition of June 1932 reflects a division of opinion about the Assyrian issue, as well as deep fissures within the Iraqi power structure. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said "regretted" that the lenient policy that Iraq had previously adopted toward the Assyrians "had become a reason for them to put forward demands, most of which are unreasonable." King Faisal, on the other hand, adopted a more moderate response. Although he did not concede to the demands of the Mar Shimun, he was willing to set up a waqf for the building and upkeep of Assyrian churches, and offered to grant a block of land for the Assyrians in southern Iraq. Faisal’s more lenient approach to the Assyrian issue would ultimately become a source of great unpopularity.

On December 15th, the League of Nations rejected the National Petition’s demand for administrative autonomy and urged the Iraqi government to facilitate the settlement of the Assyrians within Iraq. The Mar Shimun adopted an obstructionist policy, refusing to cooperate with the British-appointed land settlement officer, Major Thomson. He argued that a "solution of the problem cannot be formed in the carrying out of any plan that is entirely left to the discretion of (the) Iraqi Government and the ‘foreign expert’ appointed by it." Angered by this intransigence, the Iraqi government summoned the patriarch to Baghdad and presented him with an ultimatum. Iraqi Minister of the Interior Hikmat Sulayman demanded that the patriarch sign a written oath, dated May 28th 1933. The text of the oath reveals the extent of the Iraqi government’s frustration toward the Assyrian problem:

I Mar Shimun...do hereby promise that I will never do anything which may be an obstacle to the duties of Major Thomson and the Government of Iraq...that I will always and in every way remain one of the most faithful subjects of His Majesty the Great King.

Refusing to sign this oath, the patriarch was placed under house arrest by Hikmat Sulayman. King Faisal, in London at the time, opposed this measure, arguing that "if the Mar Shimun is detained against his will, the Assyrian insurgency could expand and Iraq will become weak externally." Yet this accommodating viewpoint did not prevail. Faisal’s absence from Iraq during the Assyrian crisis enabled more nationalist-minded politicians to use the Assyrian issue as a way to undermine the monarch’s authority. It also allowed his nationalist rivals within the Iraqi government to consolidate their control.

Having formed a new Iraqi government only two months before the Mar Shimun was summoned to Baghdad, the Hezb al-Ikha of Prime Minister Rashid Ali held a tenuous grasp on power. The party came under fire from its former allies, the Hezb al-Watani (under the leadership of Ja‘far Abu al-Timman) for its recognition of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930—widely viewed as a traitorous concession to British demands. With its nationalist credentials under attack, the Ikha government needed a way to restore its legitimacy, divert public attention, and restore relations with the Watani party. The Assyrian problem provided this opportunity. Following Iraq’s independence, Ikha politicians exploited and encouraged popular resentment toward the Assyrians.

On the eve of the massacre, outrage among the Iraqi nationalists toward the Assyrians had reached a fever pitch. Perhaps the greatest source of loathing was the issue of the Levies. As has been mentioned, the creation of the Levies presented a challenge to the nascent Iraqi army, which Iraqi nationalists such as Sati al-Husri and Yasin al-Hashemi viewed as the embodiment of the country’s national strength. Britain’s purpose in maintaining the Assyrian Levies, these nationalists argued, was to prevent the expansion of an indigenous Iraqi army. As early 1923, the nationalist newspaper al-Asimah called for the disbandment of the Assyrian Levies and the addition of an equivalent number of men to the Iraqi Army. By 1933, feelings of professional rivalry and jealousy by Iraqi army officers toward the British-sponsored Assyrian Levies had escalated. As General Rowan-Robinson, head of the British Military Mission in Baghdad stated, the Iraqis, "have always feared as well as hated the Assyrians. They have continually heard the British broadcast the superiority of the latter over the Arabs as soldiers."

The nationalist press used the issue of the Assyrians to promote an anti-imperialist agenda prior to and after the massacre. The July 30, 1933 edition of al-Ahali editorialized on Britain’s patronage of the Assyrians:

We do not agree that our country should alone remain a field for mischief-making and a toy in the hands of foreigners. Britain should be made to understand that the policy of ‘divide and rule,’ which she pursued in the past, is a policy of the past.

Other newspapers, such as al-Istiqlal and al-Ikha al-Watani, echoed this sentiment, arguing that Britain deliberately fostered unrest and disaffection among the Assyrians as a way to keep Iraq weak. Such anti-imperial fervor was not confined to Iraq; the Palestinian newspaper Falastin argued that Britain played an active role in fomenting the Assyrian "uprising" of August 1933.

Prior to the massacre of August, the Iraqi government attempted to foster a split between prominent Assyrian religious leaders and the Mar Shimun. On July 10th, the Iraqi government mutassarif for Mosul, Kahlil Azmi Beg, called a meeting of Assyrian Maliks in Mosul to reiterate once more the government’s policy of rejecting the patriarch’s demands for temporal authority. "You who are present, and who are older than he," the mutassarif urged the attendees, "should advise him to submit to the Government." This important speech also contains a veiled threat of government retaliation against continued Assyrian intransigence:

The long patience of the Government towards some of the Assyrians of fractious temperament and the leniency shown to them, despite their deviation from the lawful path, is only founded on feelings of humanity towards parties of refugees who have settled in its country. But this does not mean that the Government will remain lenient further, since those ungrateful persons who continue misleading do not deserve to receive good.

At this meeting, Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Stafford, British Administrative Inspector for Mosul, urged the Assyrians to learn Arabic, assimilate into Iraqi society, and "get rid of the present spirit of aloofness." Yet at the same time, he intimated that Assyrian men might be able to move to Syria and find employment in French colonial armies.

After the meeting--possibly in response to Colonel Stafford’s comments--an armed group of 800 pro-patriarch Assyrians led by Malik Yaku, a former officer in the Levies, crossed the Tigris River into Syria. Having left their children and wives behind, this group later protested to the League of Nations that it had no warlike intentions. French authorities forced the Assyrians back across the Tigris, where they skirmished with Iraqi soldiers who had been dispatched to intercept them. Following the death of seventy Iraqi soldiers, an Iraqi force under General Bakr Sidqi carried out a wide scale massacre of about 100 Assyrian villagers at Dohuk and Zakhu. The worst atrocities were committed at the nearby village of Summayl on August 11th, where a machine gun company under the command of Ismail Tuhullah, an aide of Bakr Sidqi, massacred a group of unarmed Assyrians.

The Utility of the Massacre

The purpose of this paper is not to debate the extent of Assyrian civilian deaths at Summayl; the Assyrians claim 3000, while the British cite the figure as no greater than 300. The exact details of the event remain murky, with different versions put forth by various parties--the British, the Iraqis, the Assyrians, foreign missionaries, and the US State Department. Unsurprisingly, each account exhibits a pronounced bias. Yet even the most ardent supporter of the Iraqi position, Khaldun S. Husry, admits that the official Iraqi account of events is a "barefaced and clumsy lie."

Most controversy surrounding the massacre centered on Bakr Sidqi’s responsibility for the massacre and the involvement of the central government in Baghdad. Despite Husry’s arguments to the contrary, there is a strong likelihood that Bakr Sidqi ordered the killing, with the implicit consent of Iraqi Minister of the Interior Hikmat Sulayman and the Ikha government.

Since the massacre was linked to the central government, several key questions emerge. How was the massacre utilized by Iraqi nationalists? What indications does it give us about the growth of nationalism and the process of state-building in Iraq? How did it set a precedent for future relations between the Iraqi government and the country’s various sects and ethnic groups? As historian Mark Levene argues in his study of massacres in history, "A massacre is a statement—less of a state whose power is unfettered but one whose power is diffused, fragmented, or unsure of itself." The response of the Iraqi government to the Assyrian threat should therefore be viewed as, simultaneously, an anti-imperialist statement directed at the British and an exhibition of state power by a fragile and immature government.

The return of Bakr Sidqi’s army to Baghdad provides a revealing glimpse of the popular mood of anti-imperialism following the Assyrian massacre. A US State Department dispatch from Baghdad on August 30th describes military parades for the victorious army, soldiers showered with rose water and flowers, and--more ominously--the lynching of a discharged Assyrian Levy officer by an angry crowd. Leaflets dropped by Iraqi aircraft during the parade welcomed the army as "protectors of the fatherland," and condemned the Assyrians as "tools and creatures of imperialism." King Faisal’s son, Crown Prince Ghazi, became the object of popular adulation because of his endorsement of Bakr Sidqi and the Ikha government. A common chant in Baghdad movie theaters and other mass gatherings was "Ghazi shook London and made it cry." In contrast, the ailing King Faisal, before his death on September 8th, watched his prestige plummet because of his moderate stance on the Assyrian issue and his ties to the British.

The Ikha government exploited this wave of sentiment to push forward several specific policies. The first was the passage of a bill for mass conscription—a move which had long been advocated by the nationalists, but had previously been rejected by the British and the majority of the populace. A speech by Prime Minister Rashid Ali in Mosul highlights the Assyrian threat as justification for the expansion of the army:

You no doubt now appreciate the country’s need for a regular force to build a strong foundation for our existence...Yes, the Army should be strengthened in order that it should protect our honor. Service in the Army should be made general and compulsory...Every one of us should share in the honor of performing this sacred duty, in order to fulfill the saying, "If you wish to be honored, be strong."

Following, the Assyrian affair, popular opposition to conscription--particularly among the Kurds--disintegrated. In early September 1933, forty-nine Kurdish aghas sent a petition to the government urging the adoption of conscription and expressing their thanks to the army for suppressing the "Assyrian insurgents." Given previous tensions between the Assyrian and Kurdish communities, this praise is not surprising. What is remarkable is that the Kurdish leaders, traditionally at odds with any government policy of centralization, should openly support the expansion of the Iraqi army. The fact that Bakr Sidqi was of Kurdish origin and that the majority of Iraqi troops involved in the massacres were Kurdish irregulars may offer a partial explanation for this enthusiasm.

In January 1934, the new government of Jamil Midfa'i passed the conscription bill, marking a significant step in the consolidation of state power in Iraq. This move, combined with Bakr Sidqi’s reception as a folk hero following the massacre, heralded the entry of military officers into Iraqi politics. Bakr Sidqi, conspiring with his longtime ally Hikmat Sulayman, overthrew the government of Yasin al-Hashemi in 1936. The army, as a vehicle for personal power, became a regular feature in Iraq’s unstable political arena for the next half-century.

After the massacres, the British administrative position in Iraq became increasingly untenable under a wave of anti-imperialist and anti-foreign sentiment. Bakr Sidqi’s operations against the Assyrian villages in August were intended as a demonstration of the army’s independence and a rejection of British tutelage. By excluding British officers from the zone of operations, he effectively rebuffed British efforts to control the young Iraqi army. Soon afterwards, the nationalist press demanded the arrest of "foreign intelligence officers" who had incited the Assyrian "rebellion." As implemented by the government, this policy entailed the execution of those Iraqis suspected of collaboration with British forces in Iraq. Yet it also provided a convenient pretext for the elimination of the regime’s political opponents.

Anti-imperialist policies of the government were not aimed solely at the British. The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained to the US State Department in mid-August 1933 that two American missionaries working in Mosul and Dohuk had incited the Assyrians to rebel. "It is essential to get rid of them," the Iraqi government argued, "or at least to sever their relations with the Assyrians." In the post-massacre period, the Assyrian issue provided the new Iraqi government with a pretext to demand the removal of all foreign influence--agents, missionaries, and advisors--from the independent state.

To the utter surprise of the nationalists, Britain did not come to the aid of its Assyrian clients. British policymakers reached the conclusion that their security interests in the Middle East were better served by supporting the central government of Iraq. The British position toward its proxies is summed up in retrospect by the British High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Francis Humphreys:

The fact must be faced that in this modern world--especially in the East--which has witnessed the growth of national aspirations and the consolidation of the authority of central governments, a minority must conform to the laws of the state.

Humphreys continued to shift the blame for the Assyrian massacre away from British policymakers, arguing that the "real villain" was the Assyrian patriarch and his "credulous well-wishers in the US and Europe."

Following the massacre, the British continued their endeavors to find the Assyrians a suitable homeland outside Iraq. In exchange for a large payment by the Iraqi government, France accepted 1,500 Assyrian men, women, and children into the mandate of Syria. But by 1937, settlement efforts were abandoned and those Assyrians remaining in Iraq eventually accepted Iraqi citizenship. Two developments undoubtedly hastened this process of integration: the deportation of the Mar Shimun in 1933 and the disbandment of the Levies in 1955. By dismantling the institutions of patriarchal authority and foreign patronage, the Iraqi government effectively removed two important barriers to Assyrian assimilation.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to challenge the conventional explanation that the confrontation between the Assyrian community and the new Iraqi government represented the inevitable collision of "traditionalism" with the "modernity" of the state. By examining the transformation of Assyrian identity from three perspectives--the British colonial administration, the Assyrian religious elite, and the Iraqi nationalists--I have attempted to show how Assyrian "intransigence" had a certain utility for the interests of each group. Each group, I argue, played a critical role in redefining the Assyrian community’s political identity.

The transformation of Assyrian identity during the period of 1919 to 1933 was thus the result of calculated policies by British policymakers and the reception of this patronage by the Assyrian religious elite. At the same time, the community’s conception of its political status--particularly its willingness to meet the requirements of Iraqi citizenship--was influenced by its confrontation with Iraqi nationalists. Although not representing a shared consensus among the Assyrians, the patriarch’s demands for increased political autonomy were perceived by certain Iraqi officials as a dire threat to the coherence of the Iraqi state. If armed Assyrians were allowed to resist government authority, these nationalists asked, might other ethnic groups and religious sects follow suit? Yet in many ways, the "Assyrian menace" was an exaggerated product of the nationalists’ insecurity and precarious political position. The suppression of this perceived threat became a means for the fragile new government to deflect internal criticism and advance its agenda of centralization, state-building, and conscription.

Beyond its tragic results for the Assyrian community and its subsequent enshrinement in the collective memory of the Assyrian diaspora, the massacre of July 1933 has an additional significance for post-mandate Iraqi history. It was instrumental in setting new parameters for political behavior among Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups. It demonstrated that the Iraqi regime was willing to use overwhelming force to subordinate communal loyalties to the identity of the Iraqi state.

Frederic M. Wehrey

Department of Near Eastern Studies

Princeton University

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Calendar of Events

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Concert

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Drama

Lecture/Seminar

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Tuesday
December 18

LONDON
IVORIES OF THE ASSYRIAN KINGS FROM PALACE AT NIMRUD

A Public Lecture presented by Georgina Herrmann
London Centre for the Ancient Near East
Basement lecture theatre, SOAS, WC1
6:00 PM

Tuesday December 25

CHICAGO
CHRISTMAS PARTY

Assyrian American National Federation, Midwest Region Proudly presents

Christmas Party With Multi-lingual Performances by

Bandoleros (from Chicago)
Albert Mansour (from California)

7:00 PM - 2:00 AM

Hanging Gardens Banquet
8301 W. Belmont
River Park

Admission: $15
Dress Code Required!

Tuesday
December 25

SAN DIEGO / EL CAJON
CHRISTMAS PARTY

Sponsored by the Assyrian Aid Society of San Diego, California
Entertainer: Walter Aziz
St. Peter's Church Hall - El Cajon
For Information call: (619) 337 0484

Monday
December 31

SAN DIEGO / EL CAJON
NEW YEAR'S EVE PARTY

Sponsored by the Assyrian American Association of San Diego, California
Entertainer: Juliana Jendo
St. Peter's Church Hall - El Cajon
For Information call: (619) 337 0484

Monday
December 31

CHICAGO
NEW YEAR'S EVE PARTY

Assyrian Athletic Club of Chicago (Winged-Bulls)
Entertainer: Walter Aziz
Radisson Hotel
Lincolnwood
For more information call 847-486-1845

Monday
December 31

SAN JOSE / FREMONT
NEW YEAR'S EVE PARTY

Assyrian American Association of San Jose proudly presents
An unforgettable New Year's Eve Dinner Dance with Charles Tooma
Famous Assyrian Singer from Sydney, Australia

The Marriott Hotel
46100 Landing Parkway
Fremont

Tickets can be purchased at AAA of San Jose starting November 24, 2001:
Every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Every Wednesday from 8:00 to 10:00 p.m.

There will be a special priority purchase for AAA of San Jose on Saturday, November 24, 2001 from 8:00 to 10:00 a.m.

Ticket Price:
From November 24th through December 14th
$75 member $85 non-member
From December 15th through December 29th
$80 member $90 non-member

Please inquire about the special Marriott Hotel's room rate and our Baby-sitting services

Wednesday
January 16

TORONTO
CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR SYRIAC STUDIES LECTURE
La Societe Canadienne des Etudes Syriaques

"Women in Syriac Christian Tradition"
Lecturer: Prof. Susan Ashbrook-Harvey, Brown University

University of Toronto
St. George Campus
8:00 PM

[Zinda Magazine is a proud Corporate Sponsor of CSSS.]

Wednesday
March 6

TORONTO
CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR SYRIAC STUDIES LECTURE
La Societe Canadienne des Etudes Syriaques

"Resafa-Sergiupolis: From A Roman Desert Castle to A Christian Metropolis"
Lecturer: Dr. Stephen Westphalen, Univeristy of Gottingen

University of Toronto
St. George Campus
8:00 PM

[Zinda Magazine is a proud Corporate Sponsor of CSSS.]

Through
March 17, 2002

LONDON
AGATHA CHRISTI & THE ORIENT

Revealing Agatha Christie the archaeologist and how her discoveries in the Near East influenced her detective writing.

The hitherto unknown interests and talents of the great crime writer are told through archaeological finds from the sites on which she worked with her husband Max Mallowan at Ur, Nineveh and Nimrud. Important objects from these sites in the Museum's collections are combined with archives, photographs, and films made by Agatha Christie herself.

Personal memorabilia and souvenirs of travel in a more leisurely age are only some of the exhibits which range from first editions of those novels inspired by her other life to a sleeping compartment from the Orient Express, from a lethal 1930s hypodermic syringe to a priceless first millennium ivory of a man being mauled to death

Admissions £7, Concessions £3.50

West Wing Exhibition Gallery Room 28

April 15-19

PARIS
Third International Congress on the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East

3 ICAANE
Sponsored by Université de Paris 1
Panthon Sorbonne
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (UMR 7041) and
the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études (IVe section).

Purpose: To promote cooperation and information exchange between archaeologists working in the ancient Near East, from the eastern Medi-terranean to Iran and from Anatolia to Arabia, and from prehistoric times to Alexander the Great.

Contact: Victoria de Caste, Secretariat,
www.3icaane.univ-parisl.fr
email: 3icaane@mae.u-paris10.fr

Wednesday
May 1

TORONTO
CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR SYRIAC STUDIES LECTURE
La Societe Canadienne des Etudes Syriaques

"Bar-Hebraeus & His Time: The Syriac Renaissance & the Challenge of a New Reality"
Lecturer: Prof. Herman G.B. Teule, University of Nijmegen

University of Toronto
St. George Campus
8:00 PM

[Zinda Magazine is a proud Corporate Sponsor of CSSS.]

July 1-4, 2002

LEIDEN, HOLLAND
48TH RENCONTRE ASSYRIOLOGIQUE INTERNATIONALE
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/rencontre/

"Ethnicity in Ancient Mesopotamia"
Leiden University
Dept of Assyriology & Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten

Registration Form: http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/rencontre/mailform.html
Registration Fee: Euro 70 by April 1, 2002

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